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The Appellants, by and through their attorneys of record, HOPKINS RODEN 
CROCKETT HANSEN & HOOPES, PLLC, appeal from the decision of the District Court, and 
submit this Reply Brief in support of their Appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
A. The evidence relied upon by Court and counsel to defend the jury's 
verdict in this case is frankly pitiful. 
To be sure, when a motion for judgment n.o.v. is made, "the moving party 
admits the truth of the adverse evidence and every inference that may be legitimately 
drawn therefrom." Karlson v. Harris, 140 Idaho 561, 567, 97 P.3d 428 (2004) (emphasis 
added). The Respondents' evidence is as follows: the Children's Center balance sheet 
showing at most a business experiencing operational stresses and failing completely to 
address non-payment of rent; Paul Fife's statement to Jeff Needs that High Mark had 
bribed the Children's Center to sign a fraudulent Estoppel Certificate by trading a release 
of their Option to Purchase for forgiveness of a promissory note, the consideration for 
which was unknown; the Center's 2005 and 2006 tax returns covering periods 
considerably prior to the property at issue being listed for sale in 2007; and a 2007 profit 
and loss statement for the Center showing rebound from a period of growth stresses. 
That's it! A thorough discussion of this evidence and the inferences that might be drawn 
from it is found in Appellant's Brief at pp. 20-24. 
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There is nothing substantial about any of that evidence; and following a 
review of all the evidence presented at trial which, contrary to Respondents' argument, is 
required, nothing substantial will be found. Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 764, 727 
P.2d 1187 (1986); Hibbler v. Fisher, 109 Idaho 1007, 1010,712 P.2d 708 (Ct. App. 
1985). 
B. Whatever evidence may be thought to support the jury's verdict, it must 
still be viewed in the context of applicable law. 
Admitting the truth of the adverse evidence and every legitimate inference 
which could be drawn from it, the verdict in this case is entirely unsupported by 
substantial evidence when viewed in the context of applicable law. Herbst v. Bothof 
Dairies, Inc., 110 Idaho 971,973,719 P.2d 1231 (CL App. 1986) (citing Brand S 
Corporation v. King, 102 Idaho 731,639 P.2d 429 (1981). The law applicable in this 
case is that which governs reliance of a buyer upon misrepresentations of a seller, as 
stated in Mannos v. Moss, 143 Idaho 927, 155 P.3d 1166 (2007) Watson v. Weick, 141 
Idaho 500, 112 P.3d 788 (2005), and Snow's Auto Supply, Inc. v. Dormaier, 108 Idaho 
73,696 P.2d 924 (Ct. App. 1985). 
Respondents candidly admit that High Mark misrepresented The Children's 
Center's payment of rent when it provided Appellants with a Lease Estoppel Certificate 
which contained false information. Resp. Br., pp. 1, 19. This established fact was the 
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basis for a jury instruction at trial. R., p. 1329M (Jury Instruction No. 31). Respondents 
also admit that the evidence at trial showed that Appellants did not conduct their own 
investigation of the truthfulness of the facts stated in the Estoppel Certificate, Resp. Br., 
pp. 19,21; and were not required to. 
The statements regarding the payment of rent in the Estoppel Certificate 
were meant to be relied upon by the Appellants, and they were: "This certification is 
made with the knowledge that it will be relied upon by Purchaser ... in connection with 
financing and sales of the Property and the purchase of the Property by Purchaser." Exh. 
25. The evidence at trial showed that Appellants relied heavily upon the Estoppel 
Certificate, and its statements that all rent had been paid, in deciding to purchase the 
property. Tr., p. 216, 1. 22 - p. 217, 1. 12. 
Under these facts, applicable Idaho law provides that the seller should be 
held liable for misrepresentations unless the buyer "actually examines sources of 
information used by the seller and draws his own independent conclusions." Snow's 
Auto Supply v. Dormaier, 108 Idaho 73, 78, 696 P.2d 924 (Ct. App. 1985). If the buyer 
does examine additional sources of information, those records must actually "disclose the 
inaccuracy of the representation." Watson, 141 Idaho at 507. However, "if a buyer 
merely has an opportunity to examine such sources, but does not do so because he 
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reasonably relies upon what the seller tells him, then he is entitled to relief from the 
seller's misrepresentation, whether made fraudulently or not." Snow's Auto Supply, 108 
Idaho at 78. 
The District Court, however, issued its Decision and Order as if the 
Appellants had conducted their own independent investigation. The court determined, 
without any analysis, that sources of information allegedly provided by the Respondents 
had disclosed the inaccuracy of the information in the Estoppel Certificate. Whether it 
concerned Appellants' claims of breach ("accurate information was disclosed 
elsewhere") (R., p. 1419), or fraud ("Plaintiffs knew about the falsity of the statements" 
and "the promissory notes were disclosed and ... other documents were provided 
showing the Center's financial problems") (R., pp. 1420-21), the District Court confused 
the required analysis under Snow's Auto Supply and Watson by inferring that Appellants 
had reviewed or could have reviewed additional sources of information which would 
have disclosed the inaccuracy of the misrepresentations. 
Even assuming that the Appellants had reviewed additional sources of 
information as claimed by Respondents in their Brief, this information must have 
"disclose[ d] the inaccuracy of the misrepresentation." Watson, 141 Idaho at 507. Since 
the misrepresentation in the Estoppel Certificate was that "[a]ll minimum monthly rent 
has been paid to the end of the current calendar month" (Exh. 25), the District Court 
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should have determined whether the information disclosed to the Appellants revealed that 
all rent had not been paid to the end of the current calendar month. As stated in 
Appellants' Brief, there was no evidence at trial that Appellants had received any 
information from Respondents which "disclose[d] the inaccuracy of the 
misrepresentation." And they never did. Nothing told Appellants that the Center had 
missed five months of rent payments in 2006 and four months of rent payments in 2007, 
none of which was ever paid. 
Substantial evidence did not support the jury verdict. Respondents cannot 
show one piece of evidence which "disclose[d] the inaccuracy of the misrepresentation" 
in the Estoppel Certificate that all rent had been paid. There was no such evidence. 
It was not legitimate for the District Court to infer that Appellants had 
found out the truth of the misrepresentations. Substantial evidence does not support that 
conclusion, and Appellants' Motion for INOV should have been granted. 
Although Watson and Mannos both formed the basis for several jury 
instructions in this case, Respondents incorrectly contend that both cases are 
distinguishable because they stem from a District Court's granting a summary judgment 
motion. The posture of these cases, however, is of little importance. The law of this case 
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as stated in Watson and Mannos has a long, established history, and has been applied on 
numerous previous occasions upon review of a judgment following court or jury trial. 
See, e.g., Faw v. Greenwood, 101 Idaho 387, 613 P.2d 1338 (1990); Sorenson v. Adams, 
98 Idaho 708, 571 P.2d 769 (1977 ) (overruled on other grounds by Owen v. Boydstun, 
102 Idaho 31, 624 P.2d 413 (1981»; Summers v. Martin, 77 Idaho 469,295 P.2d 265 
(1956); Weitzel v. Jukich, 73 Idaho 301, 251 P.2d 542 (1953). 
C. How could the rent history of the tenant on a ten-year, triple net lease of the 
property which Appellants were buying for Four Million Dollars not be 
material? 
Respondents have misapplied the doctrine of materiality, which can only be 
analyzed in the context of the jury instruction which was given at trial, Jury Instruction 
No. 35. R., p. 1329Q. 
Subjectively under Instruction No. 35, the evidence at trial showed that 
Respondents had every "reason to know" that Appellants believed that disclosures or 
nondisclosures about the Center's payment of rent were material to the transaction. At 
least four paragraphs of the final Estoppel Certificate dealt with the Center's rent 
payments, the provisions at issue in this case, and stated unequivocally that all rent had 
been paid. See Exh. 25. Appellants asked for the Estoppel Certificate not only in the 
Purchase and Sale Agreement, Addendum 1 (August 14,2007), but also in subsequent 
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Addenda 2 (September 10, 2007, <]I2.c.), 3 (September 24,2007, <]I 2.c.), and 4 (October 
24, 2007, <]I 2.c.). See Exh. 5. All of these Addenda were signed by Gordon Arave. Id. 
In fact, three prior Estoppel Certificates provided by High Mark also stated that all 
minimum monthly rent had been paid. See Exhs. Z, BB, ce, and 25. 
The statements regarding the Center's payment of rent in the Estoppel 
Certificates were reinforced by two identical income and expense statements sent to 
Appellants by High Mark. See Exh. 14, p. 4, and Exh. 20. Respondents argue that these 
documents were not intended to be the "income and expense statements" requested by 
Appellants in the Purchase and Sale Agreement, but that is exactly the purpose they 
serve. Furthermore, their importance in showing the amount of rent paid by the Center 
cannot be denied. Respondents "having stated what was untrue cannot now complain 
because the [Appellants] believed what they were told." Weitzel v. Jukich, 73 Idaho 301, 
305, 251 P.2d 542 (1953). 
Given the clear importance of statements regarding the tenant's payment of 
rent in the Estoppel Certificates, any evidence at trial that (a) Appellants did not inquire 
further into the whereabouts of the balance sheet, (b) Appellants received information 
thirteen days prior to closing that there were some "deficit balances" in CAM charges 
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which were going to be "work[ ed] out" by High Mark and the Center (see Exh. PP), or 
(c) Appellants wanted to purchase the property in a 1031 like-kind exchange, was 
completely immaterial as to Respondents' "reason to know" that the payment of rent was 
important to the Appellants. Contrary to Respondents' assertions, none of the Appellants 
ever testified that they were "irrevocably identified" in the 1675 Curlew property for 
1031 exchange purposes in early 2007; in fact, they testified to the contrary. See Tr., p. 
244,1.5 - p. 245,1.1, p. 255, 1.6 - p, 257, 1.18 (testimony of Appellant Tom O'Shea, 
identifying other properties and stating that "This was one of the several properties we 
were looking at. And had this not occurred we would have closed on other properties."). 
Furthermore, the Appellants stated very clearly at trial that the Center's rent was material 
to the transaction. See,~, Tr., p. 208, 11. 3-9, (testimony of Appellant Thomas O'Shea): 
Q. Okay. Let me ask you, would you have closed on 
your property and gone ahead with your investment decision 
had you known that the-that there was no rent or CAM 
charges paid by the tenant to High Mark for the months of 
October, November, and December of '07? 
A. There is no way that we would have gone ahead 
with that deal had we known that. 
See also Tr., p. 767,1. 18 - p. 768, 1. 5 (Kate Donahue, same); Tr., p. 783, 1. 12 - p. 784, 
1. 1 (Kevin Donahue, same); Tr., p. 798, 1. 24 - p. 799,1. 1 (Jack Chillemi, same). 
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Objectively, Respondents' disclosures or failures to disclose were 
material if a reasonable person would have attached importance to their existence or 
nonexistence in determining whether to buy. R., p. 1329Q. Disclosures regarding the 
payment of rent by a tenant would be essential to a reasonable buyer of a leased property 
in every circumstance. Respondents, however, confuse the question of objectivity by 
analyzing materiality subjectively on pages 26 and 27 of their Brief. Even subjectively, 
Respondents surely had reason to know that the income and expense statements would 
contain information material to the purchase, as the same rent information had been 
requested by Appellants not only in the Purchase and Sale Agreement (Exh. 5), but also 
in the Estoppel Certificate. Furthermore, the Center's good history with the Araves 
should have given the Araves and High Mark even more reason to know that a 
subsequent failure to pay nine out of seventeen months' rent would be material to the 
buyer of the property. 
The District Court failed to make either the subjective or objective analysis 
of materiality in the Decision and Order. Either way, there was no substantial evidence 
to support the jury verdict on the issue of materiality. 
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D. In its consideration of the Motion for a New Trial the District Court failed 
to weigh all of the evidence or the credibility of the witnesses, as the law 
reqUIres. 
Respondents ignore the fact that while the District Court may have 
correctly stated the standards for JNOV and new trial in its Decision and Order, it did not 
apply these standards correctly in its analysis of the facts in this case. On a motion for 
new trial, a District Court must weigh all of the evidence and make its own determination 
of the credibility of the witnesses. Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 766, 727 P.2d 1187 
(1986). After doing so, the court must determine whether the verdict is in accord with the 
clear weight of the evidence. Id. On a motion for new trial, the District Court may set 
aside the verdict "even though there is substantial evidence to support it." Id. at 767. 
Because the standard to be applied by the District Court on a Motion for JNOV and that 
to be applied on a motion for a new trial are so different, "it is essential that if an 
alternative motion for a new trial is made with the motion for judgment n.o.v., the trial 
court must rule on both motions separately." Id. 
By lumping the JNOV and new trial standards together in its analysis, the 
District Court abused its discretion. See R., pp. 1418-21. After analyzing only 
Respondents' evidence on Appellants' claims in considering the JNOV, the court applied 
the new trial standard by stating it did not have a "definite and firm conviction" that a 
mistake had been made. R., p. 1418-19. One page later, it applied the JNOV standard 
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when it stated that it had found that "substantial evidence supported the jury decision." 
R., p. 1420. The District Court continued in its analysis of fraud by, again, only 
analyzing Respondents' evidence, and then determining that Appellants were not entitled 
to JNOV or a new trial on those claims. R., p. 1421. 
Because it did not include Appellants' evidence in its analysis, the Court 
did not weigh all of the evidence, nor did it weigh the credibility of the witnesses as is 
required by the new trial standard. It merely deferred to the jury's determination which 
was in error. R., pp. 1419-21. 
Had the court properly applied the new trial standard, it would have 
determined that the jury's verdict was clearly against the weight of the evidence. Even 
aside from the misrepresentations in the Estoppel Certificate, Appellants purchased the 
property at issue immediately following three months of nonpayment of rent by the 
Center which was never disclosed. Respondents knew this. Appellants did not. 
Respondents admit that they did not tell Appellants anything about the November 7,2007 
promissory note, and Respondents have entirely omitted discussion of the nonpayment of 
rent for this period in their Brief. The weight of the evidence before the Court clearly 
supported the fact that had Appellants known the Center was not paying rent, they would 
never have purchased the property, and therefore would never have been damaged. 
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E. This Court should review the District Court's Memorandum Decision and 
Order on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment because Rule 17(e)(1)(A) 
of the Idaho Appellate Rules allows for review of all interlocutory 
judgments, orders and decrees. 
Appellants cited Rule 17(e)(I)(A) of the Idaho Appellate Rules and 
corresponding Idaho case law in order to show exactly what the Rule states, that "@J1l 
interlocutory judgments and orders entered prior the judgment, order or decree appealed 
from" are reviewable on appeal. (emphasis added). The Rule provides for no exceptions. 
It does not state that only "some" orders are reviewable, as suggested by Respondents. 
Other than in Umphenour v. Yokum, 118 Idaho 102,794 P.2d 1158 (Ct. App. 1990), the 
appellate courts of this state have never directly addressed the applicability of Rule 
17(e)(1)(A) to an appeal from a denial of a motion for summary judgment. 
The same errors discussed in the preceding sections of this Reply Brief 
plagued the District Court's Memorandum Decision and Order on Cross Motions for 
Summary Judgment. As stated in Umphenour, this Court is "free to examine the 
propriety of the trial court's earlier denial of ... summary judgment motions" filed by 
Appellants. 118 Idaho at 103. 
F. Jury Instruction No. 34 unreasonably prejudiced Appellants by failing to 
properly define fraud by nondisclosure. 
Respondents incorrectly argue that the different scenarios in which a duty 
to disclose exists, as discussed in Watts v. Krebs, 131 Idaho 616, 962 P.2d 387 (1998) 
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and Sowards v. Rathbun, 134 Idaho 702, 8 P.3d 1245 (2000), "do not fit with the 
evidence or with Plaintiffs' theory of the case." 
"A requested jury instruction must be given if it is supported by any 
reasonable view of the evidence[.]" Craig Johnson Const., L.L.C. v. Floyd Town 
Architects, P.A., 142 Idaho 797, 800, 134 P.3d 648 (2006) (emphasis added). As 
discussed in Appellants' Brief, pp. 33-37, each of the scenarios are supported by a 
reasonable view of the evidence as argued by Appellants. Appellants' requested 
instructions on the duty to disclose and fraud by nondisclosure would not have been an 
erroneous statement of the law, was not adequately covered by Jury Instruction No. 34, 
and each scenario was supported by a reasonable view of the facts of the case. See R., 
pp. 1204-05. As given, Jury Instruction No. 34 prejudiced Appellants because it did not 
fully describe Idaho law with regard to the duty to disclose and complicated the simple 
elements of fraud by nondisclosure as defined in Watts. 
G. Respondents are not entitled to attorney fees on appeal. 
Respondents are not entitled to attorney fees in this matter. Attorney fees 
and costs are only awardable under Rule 40 and 41 of the Idaho Appellate Rules to the 
prevailing party. Respondents should not prevail. Respondents misrepresented the 
Center's rent payments in the Estoppel Certificate, upon which the Appellants relied, and 
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never "disclose[ d] the inaccuracy of the representation." Watson, 141 Idaho at 507. 
Respondents also never told Appellants that the Center had not paid its rent for the three 
months immediately prior to Appellants' purchase of the property, which information 
Respondents had a duty to disclose. Substantial evidence at trial did not support the jury 
verdict in favor of the Respondents on all counts. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons and those stated in Appellant's previously filed 
Brief, this Court should find that District Court erred in denying Appellants' Motion for 
lNOV or New Trial, and should reverse the decision of the District Court, remanding the 
matter with instructions to grant Appellants' Motion for lNOV, or, in the alternative, for 
New Trial, and awarding Appellants' attorney fees and costs on appeal. 
~" I ' , '( RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this,' ''Y of August, 2011. 
HOPKINS RODEN CROCKETT 
HANSEN & HOOPES, PLLC ,. 
B~/lopr:t~ 
sean 1. Coletti 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL, HAND DELIVERY, 
FACSIMILE OR ELECTRONIC MAIL TRANSMISSION 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was 
on this date served upon the persons named below, at the addresses set out below their 
name, either by mailing, hand delivery, telecopying or emailing to them a true and correct 
copy of said document in a properly addressed envelope in the United States mail, 
postage prepaid; by hand delivery to them; or by facsimile or email transmission. 
DA TED this __ day of August, 2011. 
Richard 1. Armstrong, Esq. 
Wood Jenkins, LLC 
500 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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